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Issue 19 - June 2007

Contents

Cases
Statutory Instruments
Features
Articles

News

Events

Books (how to book and claim discounts)

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Cases

1. S v S

Citation: [2007] All ER (D) 417 (May)
Court: Family division
Judge: Baron J
Hearing date: 22 May 2007
Summary: divorce – financial provision

The husband and wife were born in 1948 and 1956, respectively. Prior to their marriage in 1983, the husband had established a successful career, acquired savings of between £30,000 and £50,000, and purchased several properties. Upon marriage, the wife, the only child of a prosperous family, ceased working for her father. They had two children, born in 1985 and 1988. The husband helped the wife's parents with their financial affairs and was privy to their mutual wills, which allegedly made various provisions for the wife. Following the breakdown of the marriage, no effective family dispute resolution procedure (FDR) having been convened, a hearing took place in respect of ancillary relief. The husband sought an adjournment pending the outcome of the wife's potential inheritance. The district judge refused the adjournment, holding that the inheritance was not matrimonial property as there was no firm evidence upon which he could find that she would so inherit, or assess the value of any such inheritance.

Subsequent to giving judgment in April 2006, and a further hearing to determine the terms of the order in July, he made a final order in August 2006. That order was premised on the equal division of the parties' matrimonial assets, save for two assets in the sole name of the wife, namely a 50 per cent share in her parents' home and a bond. Those assets were to be ringfenced and left in her sole ownership on the basis that they had emanated from her family and had been retained as her sole property throughout the marriage. The husband appealed.

He submitted, inter alia, that the district judge had erred in failing to take account of the wife's inheritance prospects and the fact that, in addition to his contributions during the marriage, he had come to the marriage with significant savings. He submitted that it had been wrong to ringfence the two assets in the wife's name. It was further submitted that the district judge had failed to undertake an analysis of the figures in order to see where his rulings left the parties, and that the result of the final division, a 17 per cent capital differential in favour of the wife, was unfair and plainly wrong in the circumstances.

The appeal would be allowed.

(1) The FDR procedure had to be undertaken in an effective way in every case as it gave parties the opportunity to sort out the litigation, air the issues, and to have a neutral judicial evaluation at a time before the costs denuded their assets. When an FDR was not effective, it was incumbent upon the court to fix another appointment as soon as practicable in order that such mediation could take place. It had to come before an experienced tribunal and had to be given sufficient time to enable that tribunal to read the papers fully and to engage with the parties and their professional teams.
It was not appropriate for a hearing of the instant type to be delayed in the way in which it had. The bill of costs represented six per cent of the matrimonial assets.

(2) It was established that, given that there was freedom of testamentary disposition and that the older generation might require their assets, the court could not assume that inheritance monies would be forthcoming. In the circumstances, the district judge had not been plainly wrong in his findings in respect of the possible inheritance. Commonsense suggested that the wife was likely to receive something, but the timing and amount were unclear. At its highest, that factor could only be put as a background factor weighing into the overall analysis of the fairness in the instant case. Accordingly, that aspect of the decision would stand.

(3) It was unfair and discriminatory to ignore each of the parties' contributions, whenever made, and if made by bringing monies into the beginning of the relationship. Although contributions by a spouse who was fully fledged before marriage did not offer a definitive solution to ancillary relief cases, they were one of the factors which illuminated the fairness of the division of the parties' assets. Each party had made a full and proper contribution to the marriage. There was nothing in the factual matrix which would permit a finding that the wife had made an additional contribution in circumstances where the husband had brought assets to the marriage, during the course of which he had worked extremely hard.

(4) Given the background factors of the wife's potential inheritance and the parties' respective needs, it had been wrong in principle to ringfence the wife's assets emanating from her parents. All assets which had come into the marriage should have been available to cover the parties' requirements.

(5) A district judge had a duty to clarify his judgment without the parties asking him to make further specific findings.

In the instant case, the district judge had failed to direct himself to a clear analysis of the figures in order to calculate the effect of the order on each party. By failing to do so, he had been plainly wrong, and it was open to the court to reconsider the terms of his order. Analysis of the figures indicated that each party required 50 per cent of the assets. There was no reason to depart from equality in the instant case.

Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] 3 All ER 1, [2006] 2 FCR 213 considered. Thwaite v Thwaite [1981] 2 All ER 789 and Cordle v Cordle [2002] 1 FCR 97 applied.
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2. Drozdowski and another v Garrity and another

Citation: [2007] All ER (D) 271 (May)
Court: Chancery division
Judge: Bernard Livesey QC sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court
Hearing date: 17 May 2007
Summary: trust and trustee – creation of trust – express trust

The first claimant, who was a citizen of and resident in the USA, was the sister of the deceased and the mother of the second claimant. The defendants were the sons of the deceased. In 1972, the deceased and his late wife purchased a property, which became the family home (the property). Following the death of the deceased's wife, he continued to reside at the property. While the claimants were resident in the USA, they retained a close relationship with the deceased. They generally visited the UK twice per year, during which they stayed with the deceased at the property, those visits lasting for a number of weeks at a time. On 24 March, 1995, during one such visit, the deceased executed a deed of gift transferring the property to the first claimant. On the same day, the first claimant executed a will disposing of her assets within the UK in favour of the defendants.

Subsequently, the deceased continued to reside at the property. During 2002, the deceased became seriously ill. Over the next three years his condition increasingly deteriorated until his death, in a nursing home, on 16 September, 2005. Following his death, a dispute arose concerning the ownership of the property. The title deeds had remained at the property in the possession of the deceased, and, in light of the dispute, the defendants caused them to be removed and held by their solicitors. On 23 September, 2005, the first claimant executed a deed of gift transferring the property to the second claimant. Subsequently, the claimants issued proceedings whereby they sought, inter alia, delivery up of the title deeds to the property. The defendants counterclaimed seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the deceased had transferred the property to the first claimant to be held upon trust for their benefit.

The defendants submitted that the circumstantial evidence indicated that the deceased had intended that the property be held for their benefit. They relied upon evidence from neighbours of the deceased who maintained that the deceased had previously asked them to accept the transfer of the property to be held for the defendants. It was submitted that the motive behind the transfer had been to protect the inheritance of the defendants by removing the risk that the property might have been compulsorily sold in order to pay for future nursing care. Further evidence was adduced demonstrating that that issue had become a major concern for the deceased during the early 1990s.

Moreover, they submitted that the fact that the first claimant had executed a will in their favour at the time of the transfer supported their claim. The first claimant submitted that there had been no such agreement, and that the property had been transferred to her absolutely. She maintained, inter alia, that the deceased had never mentioned a desire to protect the property in the manner contended for by the defendants, and that she had assumed that he had gifted the property to her on account of the mutual affection which they had shared.

The court ruled:

While the only direct evidence of the events surrounding the transaction had been given by the first claimant, the circumstantial evidence, when viewed cumulatively, led to the conclusion that the deceased had transferred the property to the first claimant on the basis that it was to have been held on trust for the benefit of the defendants, and thereby protecting their future inheritance against the costs of any nursing care which the deceased might have incurred prior to his death. Accordingly, the claim would be dismissed and the counterclaim would be allowed.
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3. Sillett and another v Meek

Citation: [2007] All ER (D) 248 (May)
Court: Chancery division
Judge: Michael Furness QC sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court
Hearing date: 16 May 2007
Summary: trust and trustee – resulting trust – intention to make gift

The deceased and the defendant became friends in the 1960s. In 1995, the deceased was diagnosed with cancer, subsequent to which she was treated and convalesced with the defendant. The cancer went into remission but returned in 2000, when she received further treatment. On 8 January, 2001, the deceased made a will, appointing the defendant and her solicitor, D, as executors. The will left a number of legacies, including one of £8,000 to the defendant. On 5 February, the deceased transferred an investment account into the joint names of herself and the defendant. The defendant alleged that the deceased had used words suggesting that she intended her to have the account beneficially after her death, before which time the deceased was to retain sole control thereof. D was not informed of such an intention.

In November, the deceased was admitted to hospital for further treatment and, following her discharge, was cared for by the defendant. On 15 December, she died. In response to enquiries regarding the will by a mutual friend, the defendant suggested that the deceased had not been generous to her and made no mention of the account. In response to subsequent queries from a beneficiary under the will, the defendant stated that the account had been put in joint names and belonged to her. On 17 November, 2004, probate was granted to the defendant and D. In June 2005, the claimants sought the replacement of the executors on the ground that there was a conflict of interest between the defendant and the estate. The claimants were appointed as the personal representatives of the estate. They brought proceedings against the defendant.

The claimants submitted, inter alia, that there had been no intention on the part of the deceased to give the defendant a beneficial interest in the account.

The court ruled:

In the circumstances, the deceased had not intended the defendant to take the account beneficially. Accordingly, it formed part of the estate. On the totality of the evidence, the deceased had probably intended that putting the defendant's name on the joint account would be a matter of administrative convenience. She had probably not spelt that out in terms and might well have used language which, to the defendant's ears, had been ambiguous.
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4. Turner v Turner

Citation: [2007] All ER (D) 238 (May)
Court: Chancery division
Judge: Sonia Proudman QC sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court
Hearing date: 14 May 2007
Summary: will – validity – testamentary capacity

The claimant and the defendant were brothers and also had a sister. In 1997, the deceased, who was the father of the parties, made a homemade will (the 1997 will), which provided for his estate to be divided equally between his three children. In 1998, the defendant took the deceased to a solicitor in order to draft another will (the 1998 will). The deceased personally gave instructions to the solicitor, but not in the presence of the defendant. He explained the reasons for his instructions and told her about specific bequests. On a separate occasion, after drafting the will, the solicitor read it to him and asked him to confirm after each clause that he understood and approved it, which he did. The solicitor then witnessed the will with her secretary and the will was duly executed.

The principle difference between the 1997 will and the 1998 will was that the deceased left a property to the defendant and left the residuary of his estate to be divided between his two other siblings. Prior to the 1997 will being drafted, the deceased had suffered a major stroke and his medical records showed that his speech had become slurred, that he suffered from weakness on the right side of his body and had a tendency to be forgetful. In July 1999, a letter from the deceased GP stated that “over the last month or so he has gone down mentally. He is emotionally liable, tearful and has other features of depression […] I feel he is rational in thought and speech.” The claimant sought probate of the 1997 will and asked the court to pronounce against the 1998 will on the bases, inter alia, of (i) absence of testamentary capacity; and (ii) want of knowledge and approval.

The claim would be dismissed.

In the instant case, the evidence had fallen far short of demonstrating that the deceased had a mental condition depriving him of testamentary capacity. Further, on the facts, the claim of want of knowledge and approval had to fail.

Banks v Goodfellow [1861-73] All ER Rep 47 and Fuller v Strum [2002] 2 All ER 87 applied.
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5. Re Edwards (deceased)

Citation: [2007] All ER (D) 46 (May)
Court: Chancery division
Judge: Lewison J
Hearing date: 3 May 2007
Summary: undue influence – testamentary disposition of assets – execution of will

The testatrix had three sons, one of whom predeceased her. She died on 25 December, 2001. The claimant and the first defendant were her two surviving sons. By her will made on 10 October, 2001, the testatrix left the whole of her net estate to the first defendant and nothing to the claimant. It was accepted that the testatrix had testamentary capacity and that she knew and approved the contents of her will. She had, however, made an earlier will on 16 July, 1990. Under that will she left her estate to her husband but if he predeceased her (as he did) then she left a legacy to her only grandson, the claimant's son, and the residue of her estate to her three sons in equal shares. The claimant brought proceedings against the defendants claiming that his mother had changed her will because of undue influence exerted upon her by the first defendant and by lies which he told his mother about the claimant and his wife.

The court ruled:

On the evidence the first defendant had every motive for persuading his mother to alter her will by any means available, he had the opportunity to use undue influence in persuading his mother to change her will and he took that opportunity. She was frail and vulnerable and frightened of the first defendant. He deliberately poisoned his mother's mind by making deliberately untruthful accusations against the claimant and his wife and the effect of his doing so was to cause her own discretion and judgment to be overborne. In changing her will she was simply doing as she was told and that amounted to undue influence.

The court would pronounce against the will of 10 October, 2001, and pronounce in favour of the will of 16 July, 1990.
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6. Sinclair Investment Holdings SA v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd and others

Citation: [2007] All ER (D) 283 (Apr)
Court: Chancery division
Judge: Rimer J
Hearing date: 30 April 2007
Summary: trusts – trust and trustee – constructive trust – dishonest assistance

Marrlist Ltd (Marrlist), Versailles Group plc (VGP), Trading Partners Ltd (TPL), and the first defendant, Versailles Trade Finance Ltd, were at all material times under the management and control of, inter alia, C. The claimant, Sinclair Investments Holdings SA, advanced funds totalling £2.35 million to TPL, upon representations that the money would be used for transactions of a particular type. It made the investment upon the recommendations of its adviser, H, who had received assurances from C that, despite him not being a director of TPL, which was an offshore company, he would personally monitor the application of the claimant's money. The money was not used for the transactions specified, but rather in a “cross-firing” operation involving transfers between bank accounts held by TPL, the first defendant and other companies in C's control, with the object and effect of falsely inflating the first defendant's turnover and profits.

The operation had the further effect of falsely inflating the value of VGP's shares, enabling C to procure Marrlist to sell shares which it held in VGP at an inflated price. Marrlist used approximately £9.6 million of the proceeds of sale of those shares to pay off a charge on a property which it held through a subsidiary. Following the discovery of the sham basis of the first defendant's trading activities, it went into receivership and TPL was compulsorily wound up. The receivers, the second and third defendants, entered into a series of settlements with C and Marrlist, as a result of which the property was sold, with £5.2 million being paid to the receivers out of the proceeds of sale.

The claimant brought proceedings against the defendants, seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the proceeds of sale of the property were held upon a constructive trust for beneficiaries, including itself, who had advanced funds to TPL. Issues arose, inter alia, as to whether:

(i) C had assumed a personal fiduciary duty towards the claimant, entitling it to a proprietary interest (arising under a constructive trust) in respect of part of the £5.2 million.

(ii) in the alternative, C was similarly accountable to the claimant for the profit he had made by dishonestly assisting in a breach of trust by TPL. The claimant submitted that, as a stranger to a trust who dishonestly assisted in its breach was made liable as if he were a trustee, he should, like an actual trustee, be made accountable in equity for any profit he made as a result of his dishonest assistance, and that equity should regard that profit (if represented by an identifiable asset) as held upon constructive trust for the trust estate.

The claim would be dismissed.

(1) In the instant case, C's assurances had not resulted in an assumption by him of a separate and personal fiduciary duty owed by him to the claimant as to the overseeing of how TPL would apply the traders' advances. The sales pitch had been directed at persuading H that, notwithstanding that C was not going to be a director of TPL, the commercial reality was that TPL was nevertheless a company in which the claimant would obtain the benefit of his personal, hands-on touch. Therefore, whilst C's assurances had persuaded H to recommend the claimant to invest in TPL, H had not been so persuaded on the basis that he regarded C as assuming a collateral personal fiduciary duty towards the claimant as to how he would procure TPL to handle it's investments.

(2) Authority supported the view that the remedies available against a dishonest assistant were confined to one for compensation for the loss caused by his dishonest assistance. That was because his liability was not “property-based” and gave rise to a personal obligation. More generally, the only type of case in which it would ordinarily be open to a claimant to claim an account of profits from the defendant would be those cases in which the profits could be said to have derived from the use of the claimant's property. Typical examples were intellectual property cases, for example copyright infringement claims in which the claimant had an option to elect for damages or an account of profits. He could not, however, have both, and if he elected for an account, that would merely give him a personal claim against the defendant. An election for an account would not turn the profits into property in which the claimant could assert a proprietary right. Were the court to recognise such a right in respect of such profits it could only do so by course to a remedial constructive trust, something which was not recognised in English law.

In the instant case, any profits obtained by C as a result of his dishonest assistance in TPL's breach of trust were not held upon constructive trust for Sinclair. Even if Sinclair had any personal claim against C for an account of the profits realised upon the sale of the VGP shares, it would not have any interest in such profits under a constructive trust and could not claim to pursue a proprietary claim into the property and thence into the £5.2 million.

Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 3 All ER 97 and Paragon Finance plc v D B Thakerar & Co (a firm) [1999] 1 All ER 400 applied.

Please note subscribers can go to LexisNexis Butterworths for further details about all the above cases. Non-subscribers can sign up for a free trial of the online service.

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Features

1. Law Society Council comment

I attended the most recent Law Society Council meeting which was held on 16 May and the official summary of that meeting is available online.

The long-awaited changes to the structure and format of the Council and the various boards that report to the Council is still very slow. The paper on corporate governance which was presented to the Council still requires further detailed work and a revised paper will be presented at the next Council meeting. In the meantime, the Solicitors Regulatory Authority (SRA) and the Legal Complaints Service continue to extend their roles and remit.

The Council received an update on the current status of the Legal Services Bill which is likely to have its second reading in the House of Commons in June (see news item above). Regrettably, there is no indication that the government has shifted its position on the regulation of will writers. 

Both the Chief Executive, Des Hudson, and the President, Fiona Woolf, referred to the need to continue to lobby the government about the serious problems which may arise if the government’s latest proposed money laundering regulations are not revised (see news item above). In particular, the lack of certainty in the definition of “beneficial owner” will cause problems for solicitors specialising in trust law.

It was also announced that the Law Society was continuing to search for a suitable person to replace the Finance Director. The emphasis on financial restraint within the Law Society is definitely beginning to be seen.

The Council approved a revised remit for the Law Society Gazette, which reaffirmed the need for objective reporting but also identified that “it acts as the Society’s journal of record, reporting proceedings of the Society such as Council meetings and AGMs in so far as they are of relevance and interest to members and publishing official  notices”. Over the past 12 months, concerns have been voiced by some Council members about the sparse reporting of Law Society business in the Gazette. It is, of course, vital that the Gazette remains able to comment in a critical and sometimes  forthright manner about Law Society business - freedom of expression is a right all lawyers should always champion. However, it should also report in-depth on Law Society business.

The Council also made some minor rule changes and did other mundane administrative business and finished at about 5.30pm. So, another riveting day in Council!

Helen Clarke
Law Society Council and Wills and Equity Committee member
Probate Section Executive Committee member
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2. Take aim for a smaller tax bill

The issue of inheritance tax (IHT) has shot up the agenda for lots of people. Another year of surging house prices means that homeowners with even relatively modest disposable assets are dangerously close to the £300,000 threshold at which IHT kicks in at 40 per cent.

Things have not been made any easier by recent moves to tighten the rules on using trusts to reduce IHT, but there is still one way – for now at least – to stop HM Revenue and Customs grabbing a slice of your assets when you die.

If you have owned certain shares listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) for at least two years, your investment may qualify for business property relief. This means that if you die with the shares in your possession, they will be excluded from your estate for IHT purposes. The rules, however, can trip up the unwary, and AIM has not been a bed of roses for investors – in little more than 10 years of existence, the main AIM index has grown by fewer than 20 per cent.

Little wonder that there is a growing army of advisers touting their services as managers of portfolios of AIM shares specifically designed to avoid IHT. Although their records are short, some appear to have chalked up respectable performances. Rensburg Sheppards claims an impressive 146 per cent return over little more than five years, while a portfolio managed by Close Fund Management has nearly doubled over a similar period, but the results are impossible to compare because there is no common standard by which the industry's returns can be judged.

Part of the problem is that, to qualify for relief, the shares must be held directly – not as a fund with common investments – so most portfolios will be different, even with the same manager.

Richard Allen, of Allenbridge, the independent financial adviser, said: "The managers will tell you that their model portfolio has done this or that, but you have to be very careful. You have no idea about the timeframe; you don't know to what extent the portfolio has been changed and to what extent charges have been stripped out."

What seems clear is that the better managers have mostly kept clear of the sort of companies that have given AIM its cowboy image. Returns seem to have been positive over the past two years, while the AIM all-share index has been on a switchback ride.

Norman Yarrow, of NVM Private Equity, who manages the Turcan Connell AIM Portfolio, said: "Our portfolio is much more steady. The index does not do AIM any favours because it is much more volatile."

However, it may have been the rules as much as managers' skills that kept many IHT portfolios clear of the online betting companies, which crashed to earth after problems in the US, or volatile Russian mining stocks. Investors may lose IHT relief if they invest in companies that operate mainly overseas or do not match the definition of a trading company. As a result, IHT managers tend to avoid the more risky AIM stocks.

In addition, you can pay handsomely for their services. The Close Inheritance Tax Service, for instance, makes an initial charge of six per cent, plus VAT, and an annual management charge of 1.75 per cent.

With dealing costs and a spread between buying and selling costs on AIM of as much as 20 per cent, that can make a serious dent in your capital. Even so, Rupert Yeoward, who manages IHT portfolios for Rathbones, the fund manager, defended the fees, pointing out that there is a lot of work involved. "You have to be very close to the company in terms of what's going on," he said. "You must make sure that it is not breaking the rules to qualify for business property relief or reduced business property relief."

Rathbones employs PricewaterhouseCoopers, the accounting firm, to vet its investments twice per year to make sure they pass the test.

If you are prepared to take the risks of AIM and pay the charges, the benefits can be substantial, particularly for older investors. Buying into an IHT portfolio and keeping control of the assets can be an attractive alternative to giving away money. After making such gifts, the donor must live for another seven years for the money to escape IHT.

"It's unkind to say this is deathbed planning, but the client has a higher chance of surviving the two years (for an IHT portfolio) than the seven years," Mr Yeoward said.

The shares may also then qualify for business asset taper relief, potentially reducing any capital gains tax from the sale of the shares to 10 per cent.

The one fly in the ointment is that Gordon Brown announced in the Budget that the revenue is to be given powers to make AIM a "recognised stock exchange." If implemented, this could end the market's special tax breaks. On past form, the Chancellor could act quickly if he thought that too much tax was being avoided.

(08/05/2007)
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3. Latest thoughts on pension scheme reporting

The Accounting Standards Board (ASB) has published an update on the progress of its wide-ranging review of pensions accounting. Four of the published documents relate to financial reporting by the sponsoring employer, but the fifth document looks at reporting by pension schemes.

The ASB emphasises that the discussion summaries have been issued to provide information on the current status of the project and that each document represents work-in-progress towards a formal discussion paper. The views expressed are tentative at this stage, do not represent official ASB opinions and may change as the project progresses.

The discussion summary, entitled Pension scheme reporting, begins by considering the main objectives of pension scheme accounts and reports. It identifies a number of users of pension scheme reports (active and deferred members, pensioners and other beneficiaries, trade unions, financial advisors, credit agencies, trustees, government, regulators and employers) but concludes that the primary users of the information are the scheme members, on the basis that other interested parties will generally use the information provided in the report to protect the interests of the members. Pension scheme reports should therefore provide information to meet the needs of the members of the scheme, either directly or indirectly.

The document then goes on to consider the disclosure principles that should apply to pension scheme reports and concludes that the report should include:

  1. Information on the trustees' stewardship, presented briefly, concisely and in a way that it is readily understandable to members and other users.
  2. A corporate governance statement.
  3. Transparent and clear information about investment performance, with a realistic view of how the fund is performing at a given moment in time, and putting this into context.
  4. Information on the investment policies adopted and the risks and rewards relevant to the assets held by the fund.

The document notes, in particular, that there is a need for greater clarity in reporting on investment performance and for information to be provided in a comprehensible format. Members need to understand the risks that the fund is undertaking on their behalf and to be aware of the risk profile of the assets that are being managed by the scheme. The paper suggests the use of the following categories:

  1. Equities (analysed geographically and by sector)
  2. Convertibles (analysed geographically and by sector)
  3. Fixed interest (analysed geographically and by sector)
  4. Hedge funds
  5. Property/property funds
  6. Exposure to hedging and options
  7. Other investments
  8. Cash

For each category, the document recommends that the report should disclose the exposures to risk and how they arise, and the objectives, policies and processes used to manage those risks, together with any changes from the previous period. This would represent a degree of alignment between pension scheme reporting and the qualitative disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 (and FRS 29) “Financial instruments: disclosures.”

In a further major change, the document suggests that where a pension fund assumes the obligation to pay retirement benefits, it should recognise a liability for those benefits in its accounts. This is despite a general view in the UK that the costs of recognising such liabilities would outweigh the resulting benefits – the document emphasises that in many other countries the recognition of such liabilities in the scheme balance sheet has been achieved smoothly and without undue cost.

Full ASB discussion summary

(24/04/2007)
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Articles

1. Goldie’s law

Journal: Taxation
Author: Jon Golding
Citation: Taxation, 17 May 2007, 535
Issue date: 17 May 2007
Summary: Considers whether Inheritance Tax should be abolished. Rising property prices will increase the numbers affected by IHT. Hong Kong has more billionaires per percentage of population (according to Forbes Magazine, 18 billionaires per population of seven million) than any other country and chooses not to impose estate duty levies.
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2. A bridge to accessibility

Journal: Estates Gazette
Author: Tina Desai
Citation: Estates Gazette, 19 May 2007, 286
Issue date: 19 May 2007
Summary: The commission has embarked on its 10th programme of reform. Stuart Bridge, as law commissioner responsible for property, family and trust law, talks about his commitment to making the law accessible to all.
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3. Anti-risk list

Journal: The Lawyer
Author: Edward Jewitt and Edmund Parker
Citation: The Lawyer, 7 May 2007, 25
Issue date: 07 May 2007
Summary: Looks at several key legal issues for pension fund trustees considering direct investment in derivatives. Trustees need to be advised of their general duty to act prudently and in the best financial interests of the fund beneficiaries.
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4. A bitter dispute

Journal: New Law Journal
Author: Tracy Harris
Citation: 157 NLJ 577
Issue date: 27 April 2007
Summary: Post-death disputes over the provisions of wills have become an increasingly regular feature of the law reports and the press. A combination of sharp increases in real property values and a wider readiness to seek legal redress for perceived inheritance injustices has contributed to a heightened awareness of some long-available remedies. Often the legal and emotional issues are complex, as in Cox-Johnson v Cox-Johnson and others, concerning the estate of Richard Cox-Johnson, dubbed the Rolling Stones' banker by the press, where personal emails and a secret video recording proved both newsworthy and of central legal significance.

Please note subscribers can go to LexisNexis Butterworths for further details about all the above articles. Non-subscribers can sign up for a free trial of the online service.

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Books

1. How to book and claim discounts
  • Law Society Publishing: quote “Probate Section” to receive a 20 per cent discount off all related titles (excluding directories) via Prolog at The Law Society, PO Box 99, Sudbury Suffolk CO10 2SN, telephone 0870 850 1422, fax 01787 313 995 or email lawsociety@prolog.uk.com.
  • LexisNexis Butterworths: quote “Law Society Section discount offer” when ordering via www.lexisnexis.co.uk, customer.services@lexisnexis.co.uk or 020 8662 2000.

This e-alert is not intended to provide comprehensive records of information concerning the probate sector. If you have any feedback or suggestions, please email probatesection@lawsociety.org.uk. This e-alert was created in conjunction with LexisNexis UK Legal Updater Service. For further information about any of the articles, please contact sabina.smith@lexisnexis.co.uk. The views expressed by the Legal Analysis interviewees are not necessarily those of the proprietor.
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